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Abstract 
Research has shown that United Nations peacekeepers tend to be deployed to 'hard 
cases', or civil wars that are the most difficult to resolve. Much less is known about 
where peacekeepers are deployed within a country affected by conflict. However, to 
assess the actual contribution of peacekeepers to peace, it matters whether they are 
deployed to conflict zones or remain largely in relatively safe areas. This article 
examines UN peacekeeping deployment subnationally, using a theoretical framework 
contrasting an 'instrumental' logic of deployment versus a logic of 'convenience'. The 
implications of both logics are evaluated using geographically and temporally 
disaggregated data on the stationing of United Nations peacekeepers in eight African 
countries between 1989 and 2006. The analysis of geo-referenced event data 
demonstrates that peacekeepers are deployed on the frontline. However, even though 
they go where conflict occurs, there is a notable delay in when they are deployed. 
Furthermore particularly in larger countries, the accessibility to major urban areas 
also influences the deployment of peacekeepers. 
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Introduction 
Honoring fallen peacekeepers, the Under-General-Secretary of the UN, Hervé 
Ladsous, noted how peacekeepers “work in some of the most dangerous places on 
earth in order to help bring stability to some of the world’s most marginalized and 
vulnerable peoples,” and that they “are on the frontline every day”.1 In 2013, the 
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO) backed a government offensive in the eastern parts of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The offensive routed the rebel group M23 and 
ended their 18-month insurgency. In sharp contrast to the active role of MONUSCO 
to end the insurgency, MONUC, the prior United Nations Organization Mission in 
the DRC, was regularly criticized for failing to bring peace and its limited success in 
protecting civilians against attacks, looting and mass rape by rebels, militia and the 
DRC army.2 At the same time, MONUC suffered 161 fatalities showing the real risks 
of peacekeeping. The contrast illustrates that peacekeepers are sometimes deployed to 
areas where violent armed confrontations occur, but not always. Here we examine 
whether peacekeepers actually go to locations within countries where the civil war 
rages3 or whether they remain in areas away from actual fighting. We identify the pull 
																																								 																				
1 United Nations, 29 May 2012 
(http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2012/usgmedal.shtml). Accessed 14 
September 2013.	
2 The Guardian, 8 September 2010. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/08/congo-
mass-rape-500-khare). Accessed 14 September 2013. 	
3 We use the terms (armed) conflict or civil war to describe violent armed confrontations over 
a contested incompatibility that involves control over the government and/or territory 
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and push factors that drive the subnational deployment of UN peacekeeping forces 
across different missions and over time.	
Our approach underlines that the deployment of UN peacekeepers is actually a 
two-step process. At the first stage the UN Security Council authorizes a 
peacekeeping operation (PKO) based on global and country-specific considerations. 
However, once in a country, a second stage of deployment decisions takes place when 
the UN Special Representative to the country decides to deploy peacekeepers based 
on the conditions on the ground and local factors. The quantitative literature provides 
strong evidence that UN peacekeeping concentrates on ‘hard cases’ (Gilligan and 
Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008; Hultman 2013). Peacekeepers are predominantly 
deployed to countries where the task of building a stable peace is rendered 
particularly difficult as democracy and stable institutions are in short supply and the 
legacy of war includes a large number of civilian causalities. Recent evaluations of 
the effectiveness of peacekeeping recognize that this makes it more challenging for 
the UN to generate successful outcomes (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Gilligan and 
Sergenti 2008; Hegre, Hultman and Nygård 2010; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012).  
Yet case studies on the effectiveness of peacekeeping (Pouligny 2006; 
Autesserre 2010) cast doubt on the presence of UN PKO forces in parts of the country 
where the civil war is actually on-going. Restrictions on the use of force commonly 
imposed on UN peacekeepers and confusing rules of engagement, illustrated by 
missions like MONUC (Findlay 2002), have led observers to question whether UN 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 												
between parties where at least one is the incumbent government (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 
2001). See Dittrich Hallberg (2012), especially at pages 221-223, for further technical details 
on local coding of civil wars.	
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missions are actually deployed in order to address conflict ‘hot-spots’. 
 In effect, existing research nearly exclusively4 considers the first stage of 
deployment and so focuses primarily on the aggregate characteristics of conflicts, 
such as conflict history, national capabilities, and the characteristics of the missions 
(e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2006). There has only been limited attention to the second 
stage in the deployment process, namely the local implementation of UN policies and 
practices as well as the exact deployment of UN forces within a country.5 Our 
contribution is to focus on the second stage of deployment. Before being able to 
analyze any effect of peacekeeping on local conflict resolution, we first need to know 
whether UN forces are deployed subnationally to places where actual fighting takes 
place, or whether they remain primarily in the capital and other urban areas staying 
away from the most conflict prone areas.6 
																																								 																				
4 A partial exception is the work by Townsen and Reeder (2014) and Powers, Reeder and 
Townsen (2015) who consider the geographic location of peacekeeping events, i.e., recorded 
interaction between peacekeepers and local actors, using PKOLED. Dorussen and Ruggeri 
(2007), who compiled the PKOLED data, report that the geocoding of such peacekeeping 
events is often imprecise. Further, by construction, peacekeeping events are endogenous to 
conflict because they encompass the monitoring and reporting of such events. The PKOLED 
data are thus unsuitable for the analysis attempted in these articles. Instead, our data rely on 
the actual deployment of peacekeepers. 
5 For exceptions, see Pouligny (2006) and Autesserre (2010). See also, Costalli (2014), 
Dorussen and Gizelis 2013 and Ruggeri, Gizelis, Dorussen 2013. 
6 In Ruggeri, Gizelis, Dorussen 2013 (p. 388) we note that the Security Council has basically 
two instruments at its disposal in response to an emergent crisis or political opportunity: it 
can revise the mandate of the mission and/or amend its authorized strength. Here, we focus 
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 Although admittedly somewhat of a simplification, it is helpful to delineate 
two competing, ideal-type ‘logics’ of the deployment of peacekeepers: an 
instrumental logic and a logic of convenience. Here the term ‘logic’ refers to an 
internally consistent set of beliefs and rules structuring cognition and guiding 
decision-making and behavior. In that sense, it is best understood as a heuristic 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). We do not claim that the UN, contributing countries 
or the peacekeepers consciously subscribe to a particular logic, but we regard them as 
ideal-type categorizations allowing us to contrast and test opposing implications. 
The instrumental logic stipulates that peacekeepers are deployed in order to 
contribute effectively to the resolution of conflict; in other words, peacekeepers are 
deployed to conflict areas. In contrast, according to the logic of convenience, 
feasibility determines deployment decisions: peacekeepers are deployed to areas 
where it is unlikely that they will have to engage in actual fighting, and where the 
infrastructure allows for easy deployment, reinforcement, and extraction of forces. 
The convenience logic assumes that the UN—and the individual countries 
contributing peacekeeping forces—is more risk averse than under the instrumental 
logic. The logic of convenience also emphasizes the bureaucratic nature of decision-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 												
on the latter—especially on peacekeeping deployment subnationally—because arguably 
actual deployment is the strongest observable signal of UN resolve. More practically, we note 
that in general terms, there is little variation in the peacekeeping mandates for the missions in 
our study: they are all multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions. The specifics of the 
mandates, however, vary notably over time and across missions, and are very close in the 
chain of causation to actual deployment. Here, we want to examine how underlying factors, 
such the strategic importance and severity of conflict, affect subnational deployment.  
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making in the UN. Both logics draw attention to the costs of deploying peacekeepers, 
since the deployment to conflict zones requires more resources to maintain lines of 
communication and to safeguard peacekeepers. 
Using subnationally disaggregated data on UN deployment in eight African 
countries, we evaluate empirically the relevance of both logics of peacekeeping 
deployment. We observe that peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed to areas 
that experienced civil war, but with a considerable time lag and biased towards urban 
areas. Taken together, the results suggest that peacekeeping still largely follows an 
instrumental logic, but that deployment decisions are also made pragmatically 
reflecting sensitivity to (political) costs and demonstrating risk aversion; in other 
words, in part following a logic of convenience. 
 The next section briefly discusses what is known about where the UN chooses 
to intervene and the characteristics of these conflicts. A discussion of the contrasting 
logics of UN peacekeeping deployment follows. Here, we expand on why it is 
important to look at disaggregated information in the study of peacekeeping 
operations. The empirical analysis first compares subnational deployment in eight UN 
peacekeeping missions, and next considers in more detail the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. The conclusions discuss the implications of the results 
on subnational deployment for the study of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. 
 
Where Do UN Peacekeepers Go? 
A popular view in the media and among many academics (Anderson 2000; Carter 
2007; Gibbs 1997) is that UN peacekeeping missions are largely deployed to conflicts 
where the national interest of key Security Council members is at stake. Jacobsen 
(1996) argues that media attention, or the so-called CNN effect, influences when and 
 
 
7 
 
where the UN chooses to intervene. In one of the first systematic studies of possible 
bias in UN peacekeeping, Gilligan and Stedman (2003: 38) report conflict severity, 
measured in terms of causalities, as the key factor for intervention. They find that 
humanitarian and security concerns mainly motivate UN operations, but there is also 
a regional bias in favor of Europe and the western hemisphere. Fortna (2008) and de 
Jonge Oudraat (2007) similarly argue that the UN tends to intervene in more severe 
conflicts. Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) examine 210 international crises from 1945-
2002 providing a comprehensive analysis of the politics of UN involvement. They 
find that although the overlap or conflict of national interests of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council indeed influences and constraints the ability of the 
UN to act in international crises, the severity of conflicts is a more important 
predictor of UN intervention. In particular civilian casualties seem to guide the UN in 
line with its stated principle of the responsibility to protect (see Hultman 2013). In 
short, a consensus has emerged that the UN intervenes mainly in so-called ‘hard 
cases’.   
Since the consensus that the UN selects hard cases is based on aggregate data, 
that is, country- and conflict-level data, it remains possible that the deployment at the 
local level does not follow a similar pattern. Costalli (2014) studies subnational 
variation in the presence of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and highlights that UN tends 
to be active where there was high level of violence against civilians. However, other 
studies of individual missions show that there is notable variation in the subnational 
pattern of UN deployment. Even if UN intervenes in conflicts that are more violent or 
difficult to resolve, peacekeeping forces are often seen as locating themselves 
predominantly in relatively stable areas with a reliable infrastructure, that is, around 
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their headquarters or major cities, rather than being deployed to remote areas with 
poor infrastructure where actual fighting often takes place.  
Several studies comment on how inapt local deployment impact on the quality 
of peacekeeping in specific missions. Autesserre (2010) and Pouligny (2006) use 
ethnographic methods and argue that the failure of the conflict resolution and 
peacekeeping strategies is rooted at the local level. These studies suggest that without 
a credible and capable local presence, peacekeepers remain largely irrelevant to the 
process of enforcing and maintaining peace. A reputation of peacekeepers as being 
soft targets or conflict avoiding casts doubts on their ability to engage with possible 
spoilers of peace, either militias or rebel groups. The loss of reputation for UN troops 
can encourage such groups to either directly challenge the peacekeeping forces—for 
instance, the Serb forces took hostage and used as human shields 400 peacekeepers in 
1995 in Bosnia—or to commit atrocities in areas that are under the UN supervision, 
as in the case of Kiwanja in Congo (Human Rights Watch 2008). Such actions not 
only erode local support for UN involvement, but also the overall credibility of the 
organization to operate as a competent peacekeeping and peacebuilding force. 
So far, nearly all comparative or quantitative studies have focused on 
aggregate country or conflict characteristics to explain UN intervention, such as, 
(under)development, severity of the conflict, number of causalities, and conflict 
duration. Arguably, such analyses leave out possibly relevant variation over time and 
space across and within missions.7 Over the course of a conflict, the fortunes of the 
																																								 																				
7 The politics among the (permanent) members of the Security Council to decide the specific 
mandates guiding intervention has also received scholarly attention. However, even though 
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varying warring parties, such as government and rebel forces, are likely to change, 
alliances are forged or broken, and battlefronts shift (Buhaug 2010). In such 
circumstances, it becomes important to know whether peacekeeping missions respond 
to emerging battlefronts and other territorial and political changes on the ground. The 
M23 rebellion and the subsequent deployment of an intervention brigade within 
MONUSCO—even authorized to act independently from the Congolese army if 
required—illustrate the fluidity of civil wars in the African context and how the roles 
of UN peacekeeping missions can change over time.  
If the causes of civil war are local, the PKO mission, conflict or country is an 
unsuitable unit of analysis for the study of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Kalyvas 
(2006; 2008) argues that since local grievances motivate violent collective action, any 
empirical implication should be tested at the local level as well. Accordingly, the 
disaggregation approach in the study of civil war makes use of data that are actor, 
time, and space specific. Mirroring the theoretical shift from structure to actor, 
empirical analyses increasingly rely on data collected at a highly detailed level. Just 
as the conditions for conflict are often local, the conditions for peace are also likely to 
be local. The disaggregation approach is thus relevant for the study of peacekeeping 
and conflict alike.  
As far as we know, our study is the first to compare different UN missions in 
order to explore the factors that affect the subnational deployment of peacekeepers, 
allowing for spatial and temporal variation. If peacekeepers are not deployed and 
physically present in areas that experience civil war, then their ability to address 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 												
mandates tend to change over the course of a mission, analyses typically focus on comparing 
missions (Howard 2008).  
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conflict in its localized context will be compromised. To structure our analysis, we 
put forward that the deployment of UN PKOs is best understood as driven by two 
possible responses to local subnational conditions. 
 
 
Explaining Deployment of Peacekeepers 
INSTRUMENTAL LOGIC OF PEACEKEEPING  Recent research on civil wars highlights 
the importance of variation in the ability of the state to project force across locations 
and to respond to local political and economic grievances (Buhaug 2010; Buhaug et 
al. 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch and Weidmann 2011). Civil wars often erupt in the 
periphery of countries. Geographical distance presents opportunities for minorities to 
mobilize and organize insurgencies, in particular in territorial disputes with separatist 
goals (Weidmann 2009). The periphery is particularly vulnerable to conflict when 
localized factors such as borders with neighboring countries, the presence of natural 
resources and population density interact with specific political and social factors, 
such as powerful ethnic minorities that are excluded from the political process 
(Buhaug, Cederman and Rød 2008). Geography not only affects the onset but also the 
duration of civil wars. Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) show that remote areas along 
the border, and regions where valuable resources are located, have a higher 
probability of experiencing prolonged civil wars. Raleigh and Hegre (2009), however, 
find that the location of the conflict in the periphery of a country only moderately 
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prolongs conflict. Further, any effect is conditional on urban areas being located in 
the periphery, as for instance in the eastern provinces of the DRC.8  
The instrumental logic of peacekeeping emphasizes that peacekeepers have to 
compensate for the limited capacity of government to project force in outlying areas. 
The loss-of-strength gradient can model the decreasing ability of a central 
government to impose its authority on outlying regions. Accordingly, peacekeeping 
can be seen as a form of external intervention intended to offset the loss-of-strength.9 
Typically, civil wars concern relatively weak governments that are unable to provide 
public goods, such as safety, law and order, and a working infrastructure. Multi-
dimensional peacekeeping missions are asked to provide basic state functions for the 
local populations (Dorussen and Gizelis 2013; Ruggeri, Gizelis, Dorussen 2013). 
Effective conflict resolution thus requires peacekeepers to operate in areas where the 
central government is unable (or possibly unwilling) to address local grievances, and 
peacekeepers have to tackle the conflict locally. In practice this means that they have 
to operate in areas where central governments have limited reach.10 The loss-of-
																																								 																				
8 Political instability and insurgencies in the periphery of a large country do not necessarily 
constitute a major threat to the stability of the political regime, as long as the government can 
exert effective control and extraction of resources to maintain political power and control 
over the majority of the territory. In contrast, smaller states, such as Liberia, have only a 
limited ability to ‘ignore’ rebellions. 
9 The concept of loss-of-strength gradient and the spatial dimension of conflict are not new to 
the study of international relations or conflict research (Boulding 1962).	
10	While it is common for African Union (AU) or the Economic Community of Western 
African States (ECOWAS) to deploy peacekeeping missions, either organization has only a 
limited capacity to undertake the comprehensive mandates given to UN PKOs. Moreover, the 
 
 
12 
 
strength gradient thus supports the deployment of peacekeepers in peripheral or 
border areas.  Furthermore, geographical variation in social and economic conditions 
can lead to local grievances and so affect the location of the peacekeepers. The 
instrumental logic of peacekeeping stipulates a deployment to conflict areas and 
where the population is ‘at risk’.  
The instrumental logic implies that peacekeepers are willing to take greater 
risk and that the deployment is more costly in terms of logistics and even loss of 
lives. In 2013 UN peacekeeping suffered 104 fatalities showing that peacekeeping is 
not without its risks.11 At the same time, the deployment is tailored to be effective: 
peacekeepers go where the job needs to be done. Consequently, the instrumental logic 
requires that peacekeepers are present in conflict areas where the central government 
is weak relative to the rebels, and peacekeepers become responsible for providing 
public goods and governance—first of all security and humanitarian aid—to the local 
population. Hence if the instrumental logic of peacekeeping holds, our testable 
hypotheses as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed subnationally to areas 
affected by civil war. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 												
UN only recently has been starting to evaluate policies of coordination with regional 
peacekeeping operations (see the Prodi Report, Prodi 2009). Here we focus on UN PKOs, but 
our empirical analyses control for the presence of a regional peacekeeping mission. 	
11 (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml), Accessed 2 
February 2014	
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HYPOTHESIS 2: Peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed to border areas rather 
than near the center of a country.  
 
LOGIC OF CONVENIENCE AND PEACEKEEPING The logic of deployment can also be 
articulated based on feasibility or convenience rather than efficacy: peacekeepers go 
where the conditions for deployment are most easily met. As a bureaucratic 
organization, the UN has an interest in protecting its reputation and budget, while 
safeguarding the vested interests of the member states (Barnett 1997; Cunliffe 2009). 
The bureaucratization of peacekeeping has affected decision-making at the UN and 
led to the development of criteria to decide the approval or extension of missions by 
the Security Council (Barnett 1997: 568). At the second, country-level, stage, 
standard procedures also inform decisions about local deployment. Internally defined 
routines and the reliance on standard operating procedures have historically led the 
UN to adopt self-defeating policies (Barnett and Finnemore 1999), and bureaucratic 
decision-making and the use of standard criteria also affect the deployment of 
peacekeepers. Howard (2008), Autesserre (2010) and Pouligny (2006) highlight some 
of the pathologies in the organization and deployment of peacekeeping missions. The 
application of universalism while ignoring particularities inevitably leads to the 
deployment of peacekeepers that do not correspond to local circumstances.  
Concerns about feasibility and convenience can constrain the instrumental 
logic of deployment depending on the overall level of commitment to the mission by 
key UN actors, such as the members of the Security Council, as well as contributing 
countries. The practice of UN PKO deployment is that the Security Council issues a 
resolution based on the report of the situation by the Secretary-General. Once the 
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Security Council has authorized and outlined the mandate and size of the mission, the 
General Assembly approves the budget, and the Secretary-General appoints the Head 
of the Mission (Special Representative-SRSG), the Force Commander, the Highest 
Civilian Staff and Police Commissioner. The Special Representative and the Force 
Commander decide the operational deployment of the forces conditional on the 
political and security situation.12 The SRSG and the Force Commander of the mission 
make the executive decision to move the deployment out further into parts of a given 
country based on security assessments and the success of the operation. Yet the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Financial 
Service (DFS), and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) must facilitate and 
support the movement and establishment of forward deployments. The role of DPKO, 
DFS, and DSS in decisions on deployment within a country introduces bureaucratic 
constraints, implementation of internally determined criteria, and concerns about 
success in unpredictable environments. The logic of convenience suggests that the 
UN and peacekeepers are also risk and cost averse. They prefer to be deployed in 
areas that are readily accessible with a good (or at least usable) infrastructure and 
lines of communication. Accessibility matters possibly even more for the protection 
of peacekeepers who are on the ground since it affects also the ability to extract 
troops. 
The ‘self-imposed’ constraints on where troops can be stationed do not 
exclusively or even necessarily reflect an overly risk averse culture at the UN or a 
disregard for local conditions. Missions need to be sourced with personnel from 
																																								 																				
12 Interview with anonymous UN official, Liberia 2011, and anonymous official from Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office, London 2014.	
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multiple countries, and peacekeepers tend to take direct orders from their home 
capitals leading to different interpretations of the mandate and the acceptability of the 
use of force (Bove and Ruggeri 2015); especially when the mission shifts from 
traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement. In these situations the national 
interests of the contributing countries may well trump concerns about the operational 
ability of the UN forces (Olonisakin 2008).13  
Countries willing to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions often insist that 
the deployment of their troops confirms to national rules of deployment as well as the 
existence of a realistic exit strategy. Accordingly, at the subnational level logistic 
constraints influence the selection of deployment areas: distance from the capital, 
roughness of the terrain and lack of infrastructure, such as low road density, 
discourage the deployment of UN peacekeepers. As UNMIL officials pointed out in 
the most remote parts of Liberia, such as Gbarpolu, the UN forces had limited access 
to three districts for long periods of time. In 2011 it was still common for the UN 
forces to use helicopters to briefly visit remote areas and interact with the local elites 
rather than rely on regular patrols and establish contacts with a wider network of local 
actors. UN forces were more visible in the areas of Liberia with relatively easy access 
to Monrovia, such as Bong or upper Nimba, or along major roads.14 If the logic of 
																																								 																				
13 Members of the Security Council occasionally draw up mandates that are prescriptive 
about the reach of the missions to the region, but in others they simply state that the mission 
should move into areas where it can have most effect, e.g., UNMISS in South Sudan. Based 
on an interview with anonymous FCO official, London 2014.	
14 Personal interviews with UN officials, Liberia, June 2011. Pouligny (2006) provides 
further examples of limited presence of peacekeepers in the countryside.	
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convenience influences UN PKO deployment, then a third hypothesis can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed to areas that are more 
easily accessible. 
 
The instrumental logic of deployment and the logic of convenience are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. In line with official UN rules, conditions on the 
ground should primarily drive the deployment of a new peacekeeping force as the 
instrumental logic of deployment suggests. In effect, SRSGs enjoy a certain degree of 
autonomy in formulating their decisions on the ground. This is the case partly 
because of their personal credentials and prestige, but also because of the physical 
distance from the UN headquarters and bureaucracy. Their role in crystallizing 
decisions on the deployment of forces constitutes to some extent a bottom-up process 
in shaping UN PKO decisions in future deployments more in line with the 
instrumental logic of deployment (Karlsrud 2013).  
  The operational structure of the peacekeeping force can also lead to a 
blending of the instrumental and convenience logics. When peacekeeping is 
organized from the capital, the loss-of-strength gradient and other topographical 
features affect peacekeepers in similar ways as the central government. Boulding’s 
seminal study outlines how the power of actors decays the further away they move 
from their center, where crucially the loss of power is not measured in absolute terms 
but relative to the capabilities of the opponent. In other words, the decay of power 
indicates the ability of centrally based actors to fight specific opponents (Starr 2005: 
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390). Other factors, such as the topography of the terrain and social and cultural 
cleavages in a population also affect the decay of power (Buhaug 2010). Similarly, 
geographical and economic characteristics of different regions within the borders of a 
state, such as mountainous terrain and limited infrastructure, affect the reach of 
peacekeepers. Accordingly, we not only test which logic best predicts the actual 
deployment of peacekeepers but also use multivariate analysis to consider their 
significance ceteris paribus. 
 
 
Research Design 
To evaluate the three hypotheses, we use spatially disaggregated geographic 
information system (GIS) data on the subnational location of civil war as well as the 
deployment of peacekeeping forces. The Conflict Site Dataset (CSD) is the source for 
the subnational civil-war location. CSD is an extension to the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflicts Dataset and provides coordinates for the conflict zones in given countries 
(Dittrich Hallberg 2012).15 The data are particularly useful because they measure the 
																																								 																				
15 Codebook and data for PRIO Conflict Site 1989-2008 available at: 
http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/Conflict-Site/. Last accessed 18 August 2014. 
“Every conflict-year in the dataset is assigned a circular conflict zone, which is defined by a 
center point (location), given as latitude and longitude coordinates in decimal degrees, and a 
radius (scope) indicator that measures the distance from the center point to the most distant 
point in the conflict zone, rounded upwards to the nearest 50 kilometers […]. The conflict 
zone covers the area directly affected by a conflict.” The conflict zone includes “locations of 
reported armed encounters between the parties to the conflict”, “territories occupied by the 
rebel side”, and “locations of rebel bases” (Dittrich Hallberg 2011, 2). 	
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local onset and incidence of conflict rather than specific conflict events. Since the 
conflict data (the key independent variable) are given in grid-year format, our 
analysis also uses grid years as the unit of analysis. 
  The location of the deployment of peacekeeping forces is based on UN 
information and deployment maps. The deployment maps are regularly included in 
the reports of the Secretary General and provide information on the location of bases, 
the nature of the contingent deployed and the nationality of the peacekeepers 
deployed at the bases. After compiling all maps included in the reports, we 
triangulated the information from the maps with monthly UN data on how many 
peacekeepers from specific nations were deployed to a particular mission. 
Accordingly, we estimated how many peacekeepers were deployed to a particular 
location in a certain period. The resulting estimates were spatially projected, while 
keeping the variation over time, and merged into the PRIO grids. The dependent 
variable, PKO deployment, is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if peacekeepers 
are deployed in a grid in a particular year and 0 if no UN deployment took place in a 
grid at any point in a particular year.16 
 Our sample encompasses major UN missions in sub-Saharan Africa from 
1989 until 2006: The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), the 
																																								 																				
16 The models presented here use the onset of a PKO deployment as dependent variables. We 
have also used the incidence of deployment without any significant changes in our main 
findings. The PKO deployment is based on UN information about the location of bases and 
number of peacekeepers deployed to a particular base to estimate the terrain covered by 
peacekeepers.  In our opinion, these are the best estimates that can be made from the 
information made publicly available by the UN. 	
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United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), the United Nations Mission 
in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), the United National Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), United Nations Mission in the Sudan 
(UNMIS), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), and United Nations 
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). In several cases, like Angola, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, there is more than one peacekeeping mission with notable 
temporal and spatial variation. For instance, the analysis for Liberia includes both the 
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL, 1993–1997) and the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, from 2003 until 2006). The PKO missions in 
the sample vary with respect to their deployment size and duration.  
The geographic unit of analysis is a grid cell of 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees, 
which at the equator covers an area of roughly 50 x 50 km (Tollefsen Strand and 
Buhaug  2012). We use yearly observations, since grid-year is becoming the standard 
analytical unit enabling us to compare not just within but also across countries. Even 
more important is that some of the main variables of interest have only minimal 
variation over time; for example, the conflict data are yearly observations (as 
discussed above). Using a small temporal unit would artificially inflate our sample 
(Weidmann 2013). Finally, we want to explain deployment as a function of conflict 
rather than singular conflict events, since we consider it unlikely that the UN bases its 
decisions on single events. 
To test the hypotheses on the spatial location of peacekeeping forces, we 
analyze the probability that peacekeepers are deployed in a particular area (or grid) as 
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a function of the level of conflict (lagged) in that area. Hence, we created a panel of 
grid-years for the eight African countries included in our analysis. To evaluate the 
instrumental logic, the models include temporal lags of Conflict (one and two years), 
in order to avoid simultaneity and mitigate problems of endogeneity. The models also 
include the distance of a particular grid from the border and the capital. Conflict lags 
are dummy variables with the value of 1 if conflict took place in that grid that year 
and 0 otherwise (Dittrich Hallberg 2012). We use conflict lags as direct proxies for 
our Hypothesis 1 and note that the location of conflict indeed changes over time. As a 
further control, the models include Onset Area to identify grid cells that hosted the 
initial battle location for each intrastate conflict (Dittrich Hallberg 2012). Border and 
Capital Distances are the proxies for Hypothesis 2, where Border Distance is the 
geographical distance of the center of each grid cell (centroid) from international 
borders in kilometers and Capital Distance the distance in kilometers from the capital 
(Tollefsen, Strand and Buhaug 2012).  
To evaluate the logic of convenience, and in particular Hypothesis 3, we use 
average traveling time to proxy the feasibility and costs of deploying in a certain area. 
Average Traveling Time gives the estimated cell-average travel time (in minutes) by 
land transportation from the grid cell to the nearest major city (or urban area) with 
more than 50,000 inhabitants (Nelson 2008). The values are extracted from a global 
high-resolution raster map of accessibility. Using data from United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 
Average Mountains (logged) measures the percentage landmass of the grid that is 
covered by mountains and measures the roughness of the terrain, as a further proxy 
for accessibility.  
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Some further control variables, all defined at grid-year resolution, are 
included as they are likely to affect subnational deployment, such as Average Grid 
Precipitation, Population and Average Infant Mortality Rate (based on UNEP and 
FAO data, Tollefsen, Strand and Buhaug 2012). Average Grid Precipitation may also 
affect accessibility, but is primarily related to agriculture and economic growth in 
Africa (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004).  The analysis considers the time that a 
grid has been without PKO deployment in order to take into account the temporal 
dependency of the deployment probability. We also use its squared and cubed values 
(Signorino and Carter 2010). Since the size of the country and therefore the number 
of the grids vary considerably, the models also control for the total number of grids 
per country17.  
 
 
Empirical Analysis 
INFERENTIAL EVIDENCE Table 1 compares the two deployment logics using 
multivariate logit models with clustered errors by country. Table 1 also includes rare-
events logit models (King and Zeng 2001) since PKO deployment can be observed in 
only 5% of the grids. Models 1 and 1A (rare logit estimator) illustrate our three 
hypotheses controlling only for temporal effects (how long a grid has been without 
local PKO deployment), whether the grid was in the original onset of the conflict and 
the number of grids in a country.  Models 2 and 3 explore the robustness of the results 
for Hypothesis 2 given further specifications. The full models, Model 4 (logit 
estimator) and Model 4A (rare event estimator), evaluate the three hypotheses 
simultaneously while controlling for additional grid characteristics.  
																																								 																				
17 The online appendix provides descriptive statistics of all variables (Table 1A). 
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In support of the first hypothesis, we find that the UN is more likely to deploy 
peacekeepers to areas with civil war. The models in Table 1 show that there is a 
higher probability for peacekeepers to be deployed in conflict areas, but we also 
observe is a significant time lag in deployment. The one-year time lag of conflict is 
insignificant in our models, whereas the two-year conflict lag is consistently 
significant and correctly signed in all models. We further notice that Conflict Onset, 
i.e., whether the civil war originated in a particular grid, is not statistically significant 
to explain subnational deployment of peacekeepers.  
 The support for Hypothesis 2 is mixed. In support of the hypothesis, the UN is 
indeed more likely to deploy peacekeepers to locations that are closer to the border 
(Border Distance). The negative coefficient for border distance shows that 
deployment is less likely to take place in grids that are located further from the 
border. It may also be more likely that peacekeepers are deployed further from the 
capital. Yet the effect of Capital Distance is only marginally significant, and further 
tests reveal that the effect of neither Capital nor Border Distance is robust. In Model 
3, excluding travel time, distance from capital as well as from international borders 
loses its significance. Almost invariably, the capital is one of the urban areas used to 
determine traveling time, which may explain the findings for distance from capital in 
Models 1, 2 and 4. Further, in the robustness section we highlight that the case of 
Angola might drive the effect of Capital Distance on the probability of the 
deployment. We considered whether conflict location rather than distance to the 
borders drives these empirical findings. Note, however, that the models explicitly 
control for conflict location making this explanation less plausible. 
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 To summarize an instrumental logic thus appears to guide UN missions, but 
mainly in that the UN deploys to areas with a history of conflict. Further, the strategic 
importance of border areas and possibly a strategy of the UN to balance the loss-of-
strength gradient of the central government may also matter.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 To evaluate the importance of the logic of convenience as outlined in 
Hypothesis 3, Model 2 focuses on average traveling time from the nearest urban area 
while excluding distance from the border and the capital as further controls. Model 3 
estimates the impact of distance from the capital and the border while excluding 
average traveling time. Finally, model 4 includes a number of additional controls to 
measure accessibility of a particular grid cell, namely precipitation, mountainous 
terrain, infant mortality and population density. Among these additional control 
variables only the level of infant immortality in a grid reaches statistical significance 
at standard levels. An increase of one standard deviation of infant mortality in a grid 
leads to a positive 86% change in odds of local deployment. This suggests that 
peacekeepers deploy, on average, in economically underdeveloped areas. 
 We find clear support for the idea that accessibility matters (Hypothesis 3). In 
all models (Table 1) the average traveling time from the nearest urban area 
significantly decreases the probability of the onset of UN PKO deployment; an 
increase of one unit (i.e., just one minute) decreases the odds with 0.4 % and one-
standard deviation increase (approximately six hours) decreases the deployment odds 
with 80%. The effect of traveling time is clearly robust across model specification. 
Supporting the third hypothesis, the longer it takes to reach a location from any urban 
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area18, the lower the probability of PKO deployment. The finding for average 
traveling time suggests that, at least to some extent, the logic of convenience may 
also motivate deployment.  
 To further illustrate the relevance of traveling time on the probability of UN 
deployment, Figure 1 compares the marginal effect of traveling time on PKO 
deployment in conflict areas to the effect on PKO deployment in areas without 
conflict based on the estimates of Model 4 (Table 1). The black dashed line depicts 
the marginal effect of the probability of UN deployment in conflict areas, whereas the 
black line stands for the probability of deployment in areas without conflict. 
Deployment in conflict areas declines as the traveling time increases, approaching 
zero when the traveling time exceeds sixteen hours. In areas that have not 
experienced conflict, the probability of deployment only moderately declines as the 
cost of traveling time increases, as shown by the slope of dashed line that is much 
flatter by comparison to the line of the probability of deployment in conflict areas. 
Deployment to conflict areas becomes statistically indistinguishable from deployment 
to no-conflict areas if they are more than four hours (approximately) from an urban 
area. As a further control for accessibility, mountainous terrain is included in Model 
4, but the variable turns out to be insignificant. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The controls for time are all significant which suggests that time dependencies 
matter, the longer a grid does not experience local PKO, the lower are the odds that 
																																								 																				
18 Average traveling time uses the nearest city with more than 50,000 inhabitants as the 
reference point. Apart from the capital, the reference point generally includes many more 
urban areas.	
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peacekeepers will deploy in that grid. However the temporal effects are clearly non-
linear since both quadratic and cubic terms of the temporal dependency are 
statistically significant. As Model 4 (Table 1) shows the inclusion of the control 
variables does not alter the main findings.   
To summarize, the results from the models and the simulations suggest that 
the deployment of peacekeepers follows the instrumental logic in the sense that the 
history of conflict matters, albeit with a temporal delay between one and two years. 
However, the logic of convenience also matters for deployment; even though the UN 
peacekeepers tend to be deployed in areas that have experienced conflict, the 
probability of deployment decreases substantially the further from urban areas—
including the capital and other major cities—the conflict takes place. Research on 
civil wars has found that armed confrontations often takes place in areas where the 
government suffers from a loss-of-strength gradient, in other words, in the periphery 
of a country. The significant findings for traveling time indicate that peacekeepers are 
not always deployed to compensate for the relative weakness of the central 
government. 
 
ROBUSTNESS OF MAIN FINDINGS  The results are robust controlling for further 
country, mission and grid characteristics. We control for the total number of UN 
peacekeepers deployed in a mission and also the number of countries contributing to 
the PKO.19 It is plausible that both variables are correlated with the mandate of a 
mission and the depth of involvement of the international community (Ruggeri, 
Gizelis, Dorussen 2013; Hultman, Kathmann and Shannon 2013) and could thus 
																																								 																				
19 Data from Kathman 2013.  Tables in the online appendix. 
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affect the probability of deployment to particular localities as well. Yet, our results 
remain substantially the same. Controlling for the presence of a mission supported by 
regional organizations does not change the results either. Our results also hold when 
controlling for the existence of a ceasefire agreement.20   
As a second robustness test, we have used a case-control logit design to 
compare cells with deployment to a random sample of cells without deployment 
(King and Zeng 2001). Using a case-control design also “helps to address the problem 
of spatial correlation across nearby cells, since a smaller random comparison sample 
is unlikely to include many nearby cells with less additional information” (Buhaug, 
Cederman and Rød 2011: 827). Randomly resampling the observations, with either 
excluding 10% or 30% of the zeros, did not change the results.  
 As a third robustness check, observations were resampled in order to exclude 
‘irrelevant grids’, namely grids with a very low probability of conflict. Model 1 in 
Table 2 shows that only including grids with a probability of conflict greater than 
10% does not affect the main findings.21 Even including only extreme cases—with a 
probability of conflict larger than 50%—does not lead to any significant changes in 
the effects of the main explanatory variables.22  
[Table 2] 
 
																																								 																				
20 Data from Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013). Table 3A in the online appendix. 
21 Conflict probability of grid estimated as: Pr(Conflict) = f(Average Traveling Time, Borders 
Distance, Capital Distance, Infant Mortality, Mountains, Population, Years Grid at Peace, 
Years Grid at Peace2, Years Grid at Peace3).	
22	Results not reported here but available on request.	
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Even though all models control for country size (number of grids), it is still 
possible that the effects of geographical factors are conditional on country size. To 
put it differently, traveling time and distance could affect deployment differently in 
larger countries, such as Angola or DRC, compared to smaller countries such as 
Burundi or Sierra Leone. When we include dummy variables for the large countries 
(DRC, Angola and Sudan), the results hold. Furthermore, we ran models in which the 
geographical variables (that is, Average Traveling Time, Border Distance, Capital 
Distance) interact with a dummy for small versus large countries. Table 2 (Model 2) 
provides some evidence that the effect of geography on deployment is conditional on 
country size: distance matters for large countries, such as Angola and DRC, but not 
necessarily for small ones, for instance Burundi and Sierra Leone. Finally, we 
followed a Jackknife procedure, and the results are largely robust for the exclusion of 
each of the eight cases. It is noteworthy that Angola might drive the effect of the 
variable Capital Distance on the probability of the deployment23. 
Our results are based on information about the location of conflict areas 
extracted from the PRIO conflict site-data (Dittrich	Hallberg 2012; Tollefsen Strand 
and Buhaug 2012). However, as a further test for the robustness of our findings, we 
use the UCDP-GED data (Sundberg and Melander 2013) as an alternative. This 
dataset provides longitude, latitude and date of conflict events, which we use to 
compute for every single grid whether there were any conflict events in a particular 
year. The two-year lag of the alternative operationalization gives results that are 
similar to the ones presented here.24 
																																								 																				
23 See Table 4A in online appendix. 
	
24 Results not reported here but available on request.	
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Finally, for the large countries we have run models with spatial lags of the PKO 
deployment in order to take into account possible correlation across space. In this 
case, we find more substantial results with possible spatial diffusion patterns (see 
Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015). We have computed the inverted distance 
interdependence matrix based on the presence of peacekeepers as well as the presence 
of peacekeepers weighted by the size of the deployment. Figure 2 reports graphically 
the coefficients of the two main variables in these three models when controlling for 
these spatial lags.25 Figure 2 shows the empirical support for Hypothesis 1, conflict, 
and Hypothesis 3, travelling distance. The effects stay substantially the same as in 
Model 4;26 moreover we find that the probability of deployment in a grid is positively 
affected by the nearby presence of peacekeepers in previous years.27 
[Figure 2] 
 
 In order to check for multi-colinearity we have run the diagnostic test of 
variance inflation factor (VIF). The explanatory variables are all above the tolerance 
threshold, and multi-colinearity of the explanatory variables should not affect our 
results.  
 
																																								 																				
25 Full tables with spatial lags are in online appendix, Table 5A. The results also hold 
controlling for conflict spatial lags. 
26 Notice that the point estimates for Travelling Distance are always statistically significant.  
27 We have run temporal-spatial lags to avoid bias because of simultaneity. Moreover since 
we aim to model possible diffusion, temporal dynamics are as important as spatial ones. 
Accordingly, we ran models with also the spatial lags lagged one year. The results hold in 
these models as well. 
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THE EXPERIENCE OF UNOMSIL AND UNAMSIL IN SIERRA LEONE  To further 
illustrate the main findings, we consider in greater detail the location and the size of 
the peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone, one of the eight African countries included 
in the empirical analysis. Figure 3 contrasts the size of UN deployment outside the 
capital28 with the size of UN deployment in the capital for the UNOMSIL and 
UNAMSIL peacekeeping missions. The solid line indicates the size of deployment in 
the capital, whereas the dotted line represents the size of the UN mission to the rest of 
the country. The missions to Sierra Leone are interesting because they exhibited both 
logics at different points. The logic of convenience is evident in the first period until 
September 2000 where the mission was understaffed, underfunded, and in 
organizational disarray. From September of 2000 a series of events led to a dramatic 
restructuring of the mission.  
 [Figure 3 about here] 
 
Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1270, UNAMSIL was 
established to replace the previous observer mission UNOMSIL already in 1999. 
Unlike its predecessor, UNAMSIL included armed troops to be deployed throughout 
the country (Olonisakin 2008). Initial planning was based on a sharing of 
peacekeeping tasks with troops from the Economic Community of West-African 
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) already present in the country. The 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was perceived as largely pacified and as no longer 
posing a serious threat (Olonisakin 2008: 62-63). Initially, the Security Council 
																																								 																				
28 In this section, we focus on deployment to the capital for ease of exposition. Note that in 
the previous analysis average traveling time is measured from any place with more than 
50,000 inhabitants and not just the capital of a country. 	
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approved a force of 6,000 troops with the expectation that ECOMOG forces would 
remain in the Northern and Eastern provinces controlled by the RUF at that time. 
When the departure of the Nigerian forces from ECOMOG left the UN forces without 
any significant presence in the rebel areas, the Security Council approved to increase 
the UN force to 11,000 military personnel. The build-up was however slow and could 
not support entering deeply into rebel-controlled areas (Olonisakin 2008). 
Contributing countries, such as Zambia, became increasingly dissatisfied with how 
their national forces were deployed as more of their troops were engaged in direct 
fights and the RUF succeeded in taking peacekeepers as hostages. Moreover, any 
troops deployed to crisis areas lacked sufficient logistic support and were left without 
basic knowledge of the terrain (such as proper maps). Although the (slow) 
deployment into conflict zones may suggest an instrumental logic, the peacekeepers 
missed the support needed to be effective. In line with the logic of convenience, 
countries contributing to the mission interpreted the rules of engagement differently 
and were reluctant to forcefully confront the RUF (Olonisakin 2008). They also 
retained direct control over the deployment of their contingencies further diminishing 
the ability of the UN forces to attain a robust presence in rebel-held areas. 
The fate of UNAMSIL was turned around when the USA, led by Holbrooke 
as the Permanent Representative to the UN, and Great Britain provided the necessary 
financial support and political backing for a dramatic increase in number of troops 
and logistic support. The mission reached 17,500 military personnel at its peak. It was 
one of the most expensive and largest missions at the time. Moreover, Security 
Council Resolution 1346 provided the mandate for UN troops to use force against the 
threat of RUF. The additional resources, the restructuring of the leadership of the 
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mission, and the efforts to homogenize the rules of engagement across all 
contingencies contributed to a stronger and better-equipped force that was able to 
enter all RUF controlled areas (Olonisakin 2008). In the spring and summer of 2001 
UNAMSIL deployed forces in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and established 
headquarters in key conflict areas such as Yengema, a diamond-mining town in the 
Kono district (UNAMSIL 2001). Figure 3 shows that the build-up of UNAMSIL 
forces was nearly exclusively outside of the capital Freetown.   
  
 
Final Remarks 
Where do peacekeepers go? We know that overall UN peacekeeping operations tend 
to choose hard cases to intervene, namely countries that have experienced long and 
violent civil wars. However, a full answer to the question requires looking beyond the 
country level and using disaggregated information on UN peacekeeping subnational 
deployment. Do peacekeepers actually go to locations where conflict is observed or 
do they tend to concentrate in the capital or areas that are far away from the actual 
conflict?  
On the basis of geo-referenced deployment and conflict data, we show that the 
UN peacekeepers go where the conflict is located, but with a substantial temporal 
delay. A possible interpretation for the temporal delays is that the UN peacekeeping 
forces, even though inspired by an instrumental logic, are trapped in logistic or 
bargaining dynamics. Regardless, peacekeepers do not appear to be proactive able to 
deploy quickly in areas where conflict diffuses. Further, even though the 
peacekeepers go to areas that have experienced conflict, they still shy away from 
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conflict areas located far from urban areas. This suggests potential selection bias in 
where UN forces are deployed within a country, even if the country as whole can be 
classified as a ‘hard case.’  
Overall, we interpret our findings to indicate that an instrumental logic best 
describes the deployment of UN peacekeepers, but that (at least in large countries) it 
is mitigated by ‘convenience’. Three underlying mechanisms may explain this 
empirical pattern. The first possibility is that logistic constraints cause the time delay 
of deployment to conflict areas. These constraints are interacting with the operational 
capacity and the given rules of engagement of the contributing forces. Alternatively, 
as Autesserre (2010) argues, the pattern of deployment could reflect the relative 
insensitivity of the UN to local grievances and feuds that often fuel conflict. A final 
possibility is that developments on the ground affect attitudes towards risk. Prospect 
theory suggests that actors become more risk-acceptant if they fear losses relative to 
the status quo, while they are more risk-averse with respect to gains from the status 
quo (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). If so, the instrument logic should be more 
relevant if the situation on the ground is deteriorating, while the logic of convenience 
should apply more to improving (or static) situations. Current data do not allow us to 
explore these lines of thought more fully, and we have to leave it for future research. 
Another further line of inquire is the impact of our findings on the evaluation 
of the impact of peacekeeping. Even though there is evidence that the UN 
deployment tends to follow the conflict, the finding that peacekeeping deployment 
seems at least partially motivated by a logic of convenience strongly suggests that the 
evaluation of its effectiveness needs to take in account possible subnational selection 
bias.   
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Peacekeepers 
 
TABLES & FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Probability of Deployment in Conflict Areas vs. Areas with no Conflict 
Notes: solid line indicates effect in conflict area; the dashed line indicates effect in 
areas without conflict. The grey dashed lines give the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2: Probability of Deployment Controlling for Spatial Effects 
Notes: The grey dashed lines give the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Deployment of Peacekeepers to the Capital, Freetown, 
and Outside the Capital (UNOMSIL & UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone)  
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Table 1: Subnational Deployment of UN Peacekeepers in Africa, 1989-2006 
 	
        
 
Onset Grid PKO 
          Model1 Model 1 A Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 4 A 
  
 
Logit Rare Logit Logit Logit Logit Rare Logit 
 
      
    
H1 
1yr lag Conflict Area 0.571 0.545 0.272 -0.149 -0.030    -0.057    
 
0.326 0.325 0.338 0.348 0.364    0.363    
2yrs lag Conflict Area 2.649*** 2.566*** 2.471*** 2.403*** 3.137*** 3.034*** 
  
0.600 0.599 0.604 0.572 0.719    0.718    
H2 
Border Distance -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
-0.001 -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
0.001 0.001    0.001    
Capital Distance 0.001* 0.001* 
 
-0.000 0.001*   0.001*   
  
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000    0.000    
H3 Average Travelling Time -0.004*** -0.004*** 
-
0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** -0.004*** 
  
0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
0.001    0.001    
 
Time Grid Without PKO 
Deployment -7.793*** -7.629*** 
-
7.280*** -7.171*** -9.140*** -8.890*** 
  
1.908 1.906 1.776 1.542 2.198 2.194 
 
Time Grid Without PKO 
Deployment 2 1.785*** 1.743*** 1.645*** 1.604*** 2.081*** 2.018*** 
  
0.486 0.486 0.446 0.390 0.553    0.552    
 
Time Grid Without PKO 
Deployment 3 -0.121** -0.118** -0.111** -0.109*** -0.140*** -0.136*** 
  
0.037 0.037 0.034 0.030 0.041    0.041    
 
Conflict Onset Area 0.444 0.639 0.720 0.868 -0.004    0.159    
  
0.977 0.976 0.869 0.736 1.159 1.157 
 
No. Of Grids per Country -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002* -0.001    -0.001    
  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001    0.001    
 
Average Grid Precipitation 
    
0.000    0.000    
      
0.000    0.000    
 
Average Mountains (%) 
    
0.459    0.465    
      
0.427    0.427    
 
Average Adj. Infant Mortality 
Rate 
    
0.039*** 0.038*** 
      
0.011    0.011    
 
Population Cell 2000 
    
0.308    0.360    
      
0.225    0.224    
 
Constant 5.951** 5.890** 5.204** 4.131** 0.757    0.751    
  
1.907 1.905 1.720 1.479 2.385 2.381 
        
 
AIC 862.317 
 
884.405 967.618 806.691 
 
 
ROC 0.8787 
 
0.8690 0.8045 0.8843 
 
 
χ2 226.46 
 
217.92 
    Observations 8687 8687 8687 8687 8507 8507 
 
Robust standard errors  
    
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Subnational Deployment of UN Peacekeepers, Robustness Checks 
    Rare Logit Regressions Only Grids Geographical Variables 
 
Pr. Conflict > 10% and Country Size 
      
Average Travelling Time -0.004*** 
 
 
(0.001) 
 Border Distance -0.004*** 
 
 
(0.001) 
 Capital Distance 0.001*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 Large Country x Average Travelling Time 
 
-0.004*** 
  
(0.001) 
Small Country x Average Travelling Time 
 
-0.004 
  
(0.003) 
Large Country x Border Distance 
 
-0.005*** 
  
(0.001) 
Small Country x Border Distance 
 
-0.002 
  
(0.004) 
Large Country x Capital Distance 
 
0.001** 
  
(0.000) 
Small Country x Capital Distance 
 
-0.002 
  
(0.002) 
1yr lag Conflict Area 0.122 -0.087 
 
(0.398) (0.371) 
2yrs lag Conflict Area 3.027*** 2.975*** 
 
(0.859) (0.705) 
Time Grid Without PKO Deployment -9.380*** -8.341*** 
 
(2.212) (1.750) 
Time Grid Without PKO Deployment 2 2.137*** 1.889*** 
 
(0.556) (0.445) 
Time Grid Without PKO Deployment 3 -0.143*** -0.127*** 
 
(0.041) (0.033) 
Conflict Onset Area 0.188 0.254 
 
(1.221) (1.115) 
No. Of Grids per Country -0.002* -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Average Grid Precipitation 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Average Mountains (%) 0.483 0.454 
 
(0.448) (0.414) 
Average Adj. Infant Mortality Rate 0.030** 0.041*** 
 
(0.012) (0.009) 
Population Cell 2000 0.288 0.364 
 
(0.250) (0.235) 
Constant 2.630 
 
 
(2.598) 
 
   Observations 7281 8507 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
	
 
References 
ANDERSSON,  ANDREAS. (2000) Democracies and UN peacekeeping operations, 
1990–1996. International Peacekeeping 7 (2):1–22. 
AUTESSERRE, SÉVERINE. (2010) The Trouble with the Congo Local Violence and the 
Failure of International Peacebuilding. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
BARNETT, MICHAEL N. (1997) The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide 
in Rwanda. Cultural Anthropology 12(4): 551-578. 
BARNETT, MICAHEL N. AND MARTHA FINNEMORE. (1999) The Politics, Power, and 
Pathologies of International Organizations. International Organization 53(4): 
699-732. 
BEARDSLEY, KYLE, AND KRISTIAN S. GLEDITSCH. Peacekeeping as Conflict 
Containment. International Studies Review 17.1 (2015): 67-89. 
BEARDSLEY, KYLE,  AND HOLGER SCHMIDT. (2012) Following the Flag or Following 
the Charter?: Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International 
Crises, 1945-2002.’  International Studies Quarterly 56(1): 33–49.	
BOULDING, KENNETH E. (1962) Conflict and Defense. New York, N.Y.: Harper and 
Row. 
BOVE, VINCENZO, AND ANDREA RUGGERI. (2015) Kinds of blue: diversity in UN 
peacekeeping missions and civilian protection. British Journal of Political 
Science forthcoming. 
BUHAUG, HALVARD. (2010) Dude, Where's My Conflict? LSG, Relative Strength, 
and the Location of Civil War. Conflict Management and Peace Science 27(2): 
107–28. 
BUHAUG, HALVARD, LARS-ERIK CEDERMAN, AND JAN K. RØD. (2008) Disaggregating 
Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars: A Dyadic Test of Exclusion Theory. 
International Organization 62(3): 531–51. 
BUHAUG, HALVARD, SCOTT GATES, AND PÄIVI LUJALA. (2009) Geography, Rebel 
Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 
53(4): 544–69. 
 
 
39 
 
BUHAUG, HALVARD, KRISTIAN S. GLEDITSCH, HELGE HOLTERMANN, GUDRUN ØSTBY, 
AND ANDREAS F. TOLLEFSEN. (2011) It’s the Local Economy, Stupid! 
Geographic Wealth Dispersion and Conflict Outbreak Location. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 55(5): 814–40. 
CARTER, TIMOTHY A. (2007) United Nations intervention decisions: a strategic 
examination. Working Paper. Detroit, Mich.: Department of Political Science, 
Wayne State University. 
CEDERMAN, LARS-ERIK, NILS B. WEIDMANN, AND KRISTIAN S. GLEDITSCH. (2011) 
Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison. 
American Political Science Review 105(3): 478–95. 
COSTALLI, STEFANO. (2014) Does Peacekeeping Work? A Disaggregated Analysis of 
Deployment and Violence Reduction in the Bosnian War”, British Journal of 
Political Science  44(02), 357-380. 
CUNLIFFE, PHILIP. (2009). The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping. 
International Peacekeeping 16(3): 323-336. 
DITTRICH HALLBERG, JOHAN. (2012) PRIO Conflict Site 1989-2008: A geo-
referenced dataset on  armed conflict. Conflict Management and Peace Science 
29(2): 219–32. 
DE JONGE OUDRAAT, CHANTAL. (1996) The United Nations and Internal Conflict. In 
The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, edited by Michael E. Brown, 
489–535.  Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
DORUSSEN, HAN,  AND THEODORA-ISMENE GIZELIS. (2013)  Into the Lion’s Den: 
Local Responses to UN Peacekeeping. Journal of Peace Research, 50(6): 693-
708. 
DORUSSEN, HAN, AND ANDREA RUGGERI. (2007) Introducing PKOLED: A 
Peacekeeping Operations Location and Event Dataset. Manuscript , University 
of Essex. 
DOYLE, MICHAEL W., AND NICHOLAS SAMBANIS. (2006) Making War and Building 
Peace. United Nations Peace Operations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press.  
FINDLAY, TREVOR. (2002) The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
 
40 
 
FORTNA, VIRGINIA P. (2008) Does Peacekeeping Work? Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
HOWARD, LISE MORJÉ. (2008) UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
HULTMAN, LISA. (2013) UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap 
Talk or Norm Implementation?.  Journal of Peace Research 50(1): 59-73. 
HULTMAN, LISA, JACOB KATHMAN AND MEGAN SHANNON. (2013) United Nations 
Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War. American Journal of 
Political Science 57(4): 875-91. 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2008) Killings in Kiwanja: The UN's Inability to Protect 
Civilians. Human Rights Watch: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/12/11/killings-kiwanja?print (accessed on 
02/11/2010). 
GIBBS, DAVID N. (1997) Is peacekeeping a new form of imperialism? International  
Peacekeeping 4(1):122–28. 
GILLIGAN, MICHAEL AND STEPHEN J. STEDMAN. (2003) Where do Peacekeepers Go? 
International Studies Review 5(4):37–54. 
JAKOBSEN, PETER V. (1996) National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What 
triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War? Journal of Peace Research 
33(2): 205–15. 
KAHNEMAN, DANIEL, AND AMOS TVERSKY. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47(2): 263-91. 
KALYVAS, STATHIS N. (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, Mass: 
Cambridge University Press. 
KALYVAS, STATHIS N. (2008) Promises and pitfalls of an emerging research program: 
the microdynamics of civil war. In: Order, Conflict, and Violence, edited by 
Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro and Tarek Masoud, 397–421. Cambridge, Mass: 
Cambridge University Press. 
KARLSRUD, JOHN. (2013) Special Representatives of the Secretary-General as Norm 
Arbitrators? Understanding Bottom-up Authority in UN Peacekeeping. Global 
Governance 19(4): 525-44. 
 
 
41 
 
KATHMAN, JAKOB D. (2013). United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments, 
1990–2011. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30(5), 532-549. 
KING, GARY, AND LANGCHE ZENG. (2001) "Logistic regression in rare events data." 
Political analysis 9.2 (2001): 137-163. 
MIGUEL, EDWARD, SHANKER SATYANATH, AND ERNEST SERGENTI. (2004)"Economic 
shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach." Journal of 
Political Economy 112(4 ): 725-753 
NELSON, ANDREW. (2008). Travel Time to Major Cities: A Global Map of 
Accessibility. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission. 
http://forobs.jrc.ec.europa.eu/products/gam/ 
OLONISAKIN, FUNMI. (2008) Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL. 
Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner 
POULIGNY, BÉATRICE. (2006) Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and 
Local People. London: Kumerian Press. 
POWERS, MATTHEW, BRYCE W. REEDER, AND ASHLY ADAM TOWNSEN. (2015) Hot 
Spot Peacekeeping. International Studies Review, 17: 46-66 
PRODI, Romano (2009). General Assembly/Security Council.  A /64/359–S/2009/470 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20S2009%20470.pdf [Accessed on 01 
November 2015]. 
RALEIGH, CLIONADH AND HÅVARD HEGRE. (2009) Population Size, Concentration, 
and Civil War: A Geographically Disaggregated Analysis. Political Geography 
28(4): 224–38. 
RUGGERI, ANDREA, THEODORA-ISMENE GIZELIS, AND HAN DORUSSEN. (2013) 
Managing Mistrust: an Analysis of Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping in 
Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(3):387-409. 
SIGNORINO, CURTIS S., AND DAVID B. CARTER. (2010)	Back to the Future: Modeling 
Time Dependence in Binary Data. Political Analysis 18(3): 271–92. 
STARR, HARVEY. (2005) Territory, Proximity, and Spatiality: The Geography of 
International Conflict. International Studies Review 7(3): 387–406. 
SUNDBERG, RALPH, AND ERIK MELANDER, (2013) Introducing the UCDP 
Georeferenced Event Dataset.  Journal of Peace Research 50(4):523-532 
 
 
42 
 
TOLLEFSEN, ANDREAS, HÅVARD STRAND, AND HALVARD BUHAUG. (2012). PRIO-
GRID: A unified spatial data structure. Journal of Peace Research 49(2):363–
74.  
TOWNSEN, ASHLY A., AND BRYCE W. REEDER. (2014). Where Do Peacekeepers Go 
When They Go? Explaining the Spatial Heterogeneity of Peacekeeping 
Deployment. 18: 69-91. 
WALLENSTEEN, PETER, AND MARGARETA SOLLENBERG. (2001). Armed Conflict 
1989–2000. Journal of Peace Research 38(5): 629–644. 
WEIDMANN, NILS. (2009) Geography as Motivation and Opportunity Group 
Concentration and Ethnic Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4): 526–
43. 
WEIDMANN, NILS. (2013) The Higher the Better? The Limits of Analytical Resolution 
in Conflict Event Datasets. Cooperation and Conflict 48(4): 567-576. 
 
